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Consecutive multilateral trade talks at the level of the WTO have resulted in a
general reduction of tariffs and VERs on trade between member countries. Coinciding
with the fall in the traditional trade policy tools, a rise in new forms of protection has
occurred. Especially the use of antidumping measures seems at least in part to have
replaced the tariffs and VERs. One important distinction between the traditional and
the new forms of trade protection is that the latter are generally felt to be more
selective and less transparent (Ethier and Fischer, 1990).
Antidumping protection can only be imposed on products coming from countries
'named' by the import competing home industry as alleged dumpers. The purpose of
this paper is to analyse empirically the pattern of import flows of 'named' versus
'non-named' importers in European (EU) antidumping cases that were initiated
between 1985 and 1990. This paper is motivated by the relatively low number of
empirical studies which stands in sharp contrast with the many theoretical
contributions in recent years.
In particular, one class of theoretical models analyses the effects on trade flows as
a result of strategic actions of firms induced by the threat of having an antidumping
measure imposed on them. Fischer (1992), Reitzes (1993), Prusa (1994) and more
recently Pauwels et al. (1997) have all used dynamic (two-period) duopoly models
with a home and a foreign firm competing for the home market to show that a foreign
firm can strategically reduce its first period exports to the home market to lower the
probability of second period antidumping duties levied by the home country. This
theoretical prediction has been empirically confirmed in a number of studies for the
US (Moore,1992; Hansen and Prusa, 1997). In addition, Staiger and Wolak (1994)have shown the existence of an 'investigation effect' where foreign firms already
under investigation (but before the decision of protection is taken) significantly
reduce their exports to the US.
A different class of model argues that an increase in foreign imports in anticipation
of future protection is also possible. Anderson (1992, 1993), for example, shows that
foreign firms will increase their dumped imports when there is a positive probability
that dumping will give rise to a future quantitative restriction on exports (VER),
allocated through licences. The increase in dumped imports are aimed at securing
future export licences. Blonigen and Ohno (1998) argue that foreign firms can display
diverse reactions when facing potential antidumping protection. They develop a two
period model consisting of two foreign firms belonging to different countries
exporting to the US market with the possibility to engage in foreign direct investment
(FDI) in period two. The model shows the existence of a 'protection building
equilibrium' where the foreign firm that intends to engage in second period FDI
(while the other does not), increases its first period exports in order to increase the
probability of protection facing the other foreign firm in period two. The other foreign
firm will reduce its first period exports in an attempt to lower the second period
probability of protection. Blonigen and Ohno (1998) report case evidence for the US
consistent with this type of trade diversion from one foreign exporter to another.
The body of theoretical work described above suggests that antidumping measures
have an effect on trade flows. However, relatively few models have looked at trade
diversion from named to non-named firms after the initiation of a case. In most of the
duopoly models discussed above, the second period is one where protection prevails
or not depending on first period reactions by a home and a foreign firm. In the case of
protection, the foreign firm reduces its exports, while in the absence of protection theforeign firm's price and imports are the free trade ones2. Hence the foreign firm is
either named or non-named which makes these models unsuitable for testing
predictions on import diversion from named to non-named firms. The issue of import
diversion is therefore still very much an empirical issue.
Staiger and Wolak (1994) find evidence of trade diversion for the US on SIC
data (four digit) during the investigation period whereby overall imports are restricted
by about one third to one half as much as imports from named countries are restricted.
Prusa (1997) using more disaggregated data (TSUSA seven digit data) finds a larger
amount of trade diversion for the US. When considering a period of six years after the
year of initiation, Prusa (1997) finds that most of the protective effect of antidumping
duties is offset by increased imports from non-named countries.
The purpose of this paper is a first attempt to measure —andcontrast with the US —
theeffects of European antidumping measures on import flows. This is particularly
useful as the European antidumping legislation deviates from the US one in a number
of respects. First, the level of antidumping protection in the EU is limited to the injury
margin provided it is smaller than the dumping margin. In the US, the duty is always
based on the dumping margin which results in higher duty levels (Belderbos, 1997).
Second, the EU besides duties often imposes price undertakings which can be
compared to 'voluntary price restraints'3 (Laird, 1999). Third, duties in the EU are
levied prospectively, this means only after a positive dumping and injury finding. The
US has a retrospective duty system where a bond has to be deposited before the
2Arecent theoretical paper by Springael and Vandenbussche (1999) including a named and a non-
named foreign firm shows that while antidumping protection both in the case of a duty and a price-
undertaking reduces the import values of the named, can also raise the import values of the non-named
firm.
A price-undertaking is a commitment by the foreign importer to eliminate injury by pulling up its
price in the European market. This commitment is imposed and closely monitored by the Commissionoutcome of an investigation is known but which is paid back in case the alleged
dumper is not found guilty4. Fourth, withdrawals by the complainants hardly ever
occur in the EU. The majority of terminated cases in the EU are cases where 'no
measures' are imposed because the accused is not found guilty5. Finally, the EU
Sunset clause stipulates that antidumping measures automatically lapse after 5 years,
in contrast to the US where measures only lapse if the foreign importer shows
dumping has stopped.
This paper has also relevance for policy. In particular, by investigating the amount
of trade diversion induced by antidumping we are able to assess the effectiveness of
antidumping policy as a tool for protection. This may be important for competition
and trade policy and future negotiations at the WTO level6.
We find evidence that -incontrast to the US -importdiversion in the European
Union is low. This qualitative result holds irrespective of the estimation method and
econometric model that we use. However, the magnitude of the effects of
antidumping measures varies according to the method and model used and therefore
caution is needed for interpreting the size of the estimated coefficients.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section II we describe the data and
show the pattern of trade flows for named and non-named countries. Section III
discusses the econometric approach, section IV gives and discusses the empirical
results. Section V is a concluding one.
and in case of violation heavily penalized. Price-undertakings are shown to be facilitating practices for
home and foreign firms involved in EU antidumping cases (see Veugelers and Vandenbussche 1999). 'Arefund of duty revenue in the EU is possible in principle but in practice very difficult to obtain.
Refunds have only occurred in very few cases and may take up to ten years after the period of
Interest over this period is never refunded (Bellis, 1990).
Over the period we considered (1985-90) of the 80 products for which the investigation was
terminated, only 5 refer to withdrawals and only 2 are suspensions.II.Data
The data set we use consists of all European AD-investigations7 initiated
between 1985 and 1990. This resulted in 246 cases8 of which 105 ended in the
imposition of duties (42 %), 61 in price-undertakings (25%) and in 80 cases the
investigation was terminated by the Commission (33%). For each investigated
product, annual import trade data of the EU by source country were collected from
the EUROSTAT trade statistics. Up to 1988 Eurostat reports data using the Nimexe 6
digit product codes, while after 1988 the 8 digit Harmonised System (HS) codes are
used to identify products. In order to construct full time series for certain cases the
Nimexe 6-digit and the HS 8-digit codes were correlated using correspondence tables.
For each product, import values by country of origin were collected for nine
consecutive years9 starting two years before the initiation of an antidumping
investigation by the European Commission10. The year of initiation is indicated by t0.
The period of investigation following the initiation of a case lasts on average twelve
months and usually corresponds with time t1 during which the outcome of an
investigation is still uncertain. Antidumping protection in the EU is prospective in the
sense that measures are imposed for five years if the investigation is concluded
affirmatively. Hence , the period of protection usually runs from t1 to t6In order to
6 A new round of WTO talks is planned to start in the Fall of 1999.
Source: various issues of the Official Journal of the European Community.
Each case involves one product. After dropping cases for which no complete time-series could be
constructed we were left with 246 products.
A correction was applied to Eastern European countries that either stopped to exist after 1990
(German Democratic Republic) or that were split into separate countries or regions like
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the Sovjet Union.
tO Since we consider antidumping cases initiated between 1985-90, total data requirements run from
1983 to 1996.
Exceptionally measures can already apply in and t1.compare the import values'2 over time, the time series were deflated using GNP-price
deflators.
Between 1985 and 1990, a total of 48 countries were subject to European AD-
investigations. Table 1 shows the geographical spread of countries accused of
dumping in the EU market over this period. About 70% of all antidumping cases are
against low cost countries (category 2 and 3). One potential reason for this
phenomenon is that developing countries and non-market economies are less
competitive and more monopolized than the European market. This makes these
countries more prone to a violation of the dumping condition which stipulates that
export prices should not be lower than prices in the country of origin (Bhagwati,
1989). Another plausible explanation for the high frequency with which low cost
countries occur in the antidumping cases is that these countries violate the injury
conditions more easily as shown by Veugelers and Vandenbussche (1999): in a
differentiated duopoly model a cost advantage for an importer results in foreign price
undercutting on the European market, which is an important determinant of injury.
The pattern of named countries described in table 1 is very similar to the US,
where most antidumping cases are also initiated against low wage countries (Prusa,
1997). Messerlin and Reed (1995) and Belderbos (1997) point at the similarity of the
EU and US in terms of the type of sectors and products occurring in antidumping
cases. This suggests the absence of a country and sector bias specific to one of the two
trade blocs.
In table 2 we list the European sectors (NACE 2 digit classification) most
frequently filing dumping complaints to the EU Commission. Especially the chemical
industry (magnesite, copper sulphate, urea), and to a lesser extent the Processing of
12
Importvalues were used which involve the unit price times the quantity shipped to the EU.Metals Industry (iron and steel and non-ferrous metals), Mechanical Engineering
(transmission equipment like ball bearings and roller chains) and Electric engineering
(typewriters, printers, copiers) seem to trigger AD-investigations.
In table 3 we show summary statistics on the import values and import growth
that characterize our dataset. Both the mean and the median values for the named,
non-named and overall import values at to, the year of initiation, are shown. First, it
can be noted that the mean and median import size are lower in named than in non-
named countries. Indeed, the average share of named countries' imports in total
imports at to is 26% while 74% for the non-named countries. In addition, named
countries' import values often show very high import growth rates at the time of
initiation as shown in the last two rows of table 3. The average growth for the named
countries at to is almost 2000%. This extremely high mean value is due to a number of
outliers in the data. To give just one example. In 1985 the Commission started a
dumping investigation against typewriters' imports from Taiwan. While Taiwanese
import values were still zero two years prior to to, they rose from a 1000 ECU in the
year before to to 4 259 000 ECU in the year to. Cases like this one are an illustration
that these outliers are often new importers entering the EU market aggressively with
very high import growth rates. The median growth rate in the data is more
representative however and is similar for named and non-named countries, 0 and —2%
respectively.
A first indication of whether import diversion in response to European
antidumping cases takes place can be found in figure 1, where we show the evolution
of import values at the product level averaged over all AD-cases distinguishing
between named and non-named countries (including outliers) imports' share.
Observations above the horizontal axis reflect an increase in the share of importvalues relative to to, while observations below the horizontal axis represent the
opposite namely a reduction in the share of import values relative to to. The different
effects on the named countries imports' share relative to the share of the non-named
become immediately apparent from figure 1. All the lines that lie below the horizontal
axis after to show the evolution of the named countries' import share, while all the
lines above the horizontal axis represent the non-named countries' import share
relative to total imports. For the named countries, the effects of a duty and a price-
undertaking on the imports share appear to be more negative than under a termination.
However, even in the case of the latter, when the demand for protection is rejected,
imports from named countries continue to be restricted. They do not rebound to the
levels at the time of initiation. For the non-named countries, the share in total import
values on average goes up relative to to. This increase appears to be stronger in duty
and price-undertaking cases than in terminated cases. The distance between the
upward sloping curves for the non-named and the downward sloping curves for the
named countries gives us a first rough idea of the amount of import diversion from the
named to the non-named countries which will be tested for more rigorously in the
next section controlling for outliers, sector and business cycle effects. Based on
figure 1, it seems that import diversion is not sufficient to mitigate the effects of
antidumping actions.III.Econometric Approach
The main objective in this section is to test whether import diversion in
Europe is sufficient to mitigate the effects of antidumping actions as it is the case in
the US, after taking into account other factors which might influence import flows. To
this end, we experimented with a variety of econometric methods and models, which
allows us to assess the robustness of the estimates.
The basic econometric model we seek to estimate is a reduced form with the
following general specification which allows us to test a number of hypotheses. In
particular,
ln importit =ao+a' lnimp itO -i+a2Dl,+ a3UI1+a4T
(1)
+asDccN+a6UIOCNI+aTxN+ccsNum+a9NumixNI+aioN+So
where ln itnportit stands for the natural log of imports for case i (i =l,..246) at time t
(t=O,. ..6).D is a dummy equal to 1 if there is a duty for case i at time t, U is a dummy
equal to 1 if there is a price undertaking for case i at time t, T is a dummy equal to 1 if
there is a termination for case i at time t. A dummy N is included for named countries
(equal to 1 for named countries in case i and equal to 0 for non-named). This dummy
is also used to interact with the policy variables to capture the effects of antidumping
actions on the named countries (DxN, UxN, TxIV).Thevariable Num proxies for the
number of named countries in a case and is the log number of countries that are
named in an investigation. Num captures the effect that trade diversion will be lower
when many countries are named as in Prusa (1997). Finally, subscript toj refers to the
year prior to to, the year of initiation. The import value for to_i is included to control
for initial import size effects and for the evolution of imports prior to an antidumpinginvestigation.This may be important as the average total import value for named
countries is smaller than the one for non-named countries as shown in table 3.
In estimating equation (1) we also take into account year dummies to control
for aggregate shocks'3. This can be relevant as firms may have incentives to file a
complaint in recessions when dumping and injury are more likely to be demonstrated
(Das, 1992). In addition, we control for unobserved fixed effects by including 3-digit
NACE-seetor dummies. These sector dummies control for unobserved sector
heterogeneity, such as sunk costs, the life cycle of the sector (mature versus young),
etc. and hence these dummies can capture to some extent a possible selection bias .In
particular, it might be the case that there exist certain sector charateristics which
trigger antidumping investigations more easily than others. By controlling for
narrowly defined sector dummies, we can control for these unobservable fixed
characteristics.
The effects of import diversion can be read off by comparing the effects of
duties (D), undertakings (U) and terminations (T) with the same variables interacted
with a dummy equal to 1 for named countries (N), DxN, UxN and TxN. To illustrate
how this equation should be interpreted, the effect of duties (D) on the import values
of the non-named countries is measured by coefficienta2 and for the named countries
by the sum of a2andas. Equation (1) implies that we impose some more
restrictions on some variables in the model. For example, equation (1) assumes that
the effects of the initial import levels are the same for named and non-named
countries. We therefore also report the results based on split samples (named versus
non-named), however, we found very similar qualitative results.
13Wealso experimented with interacting time dummies with the AD measures, in addition to intercept
dummies, however, this imposes high multicoillinearity and we therefore do not report these results.
Moreover, figure 1 suggests that the effects of AD-measures are linear which renders the inclusion of
slope dummies useless.There are some technical considerations to be made in estimating (1). A first
consideration is that observations within a case, but over time, are not independent,
while the observations across cases are. To take this into account we estimate the
model with OLS white consistent standard errors in which clusters are considered
based on the case under consideration'4. In other words, the observations for each
case are considered as one cluster, which is taken into account when estimating the
standard errors.
A second consideration is related to the nature of the data. As already
illustrated in the summary statistics of table 3 there are a number of outliers in terms
of import growth in the sample, due to the fact that some importers are newcomers on
the EU market. The number and position of the outliers are shown in figure 4 where
we plot log imports in to_i on the horizontal axis and log imports in to on the vertical
axis. The deviation from the 45°-degree line shows the growth rate in imports
between t0, and to. In view of the considerable number of outliers, which questions
the normality assumption required for OLS and which can affect the average estimate
in the regression analysis in a spurious way, we use a robust regression technique
(Hamilton, 1991) to obtain a robust estimate of the average effect. The intuition
behind this technique is that outliers are given a lower weight in the estimation
relative to observations which are closer to the mean. In particular, observations with
small residuals receive weights of 1, while observations with larger residuals receive
gradually smaller weights. These are called Huber weights (Huber, 1964) and are
implemented iteratively. We will report both the results based on OLS, adjusted for
the clustering in the data, and the results based on robust regression techniques.
14Analternative is to use a random effects model for panel data, which imposes strong assumptions on
the error term. We experimented with random effects models as an alternative, but the results were
very similar, so we do not report them here.A final consideration is related to a concern about selection bias. The fact that
a country is named in an investigation might be triggered by high import growth prior
to the initiation of a case. There may also exist other unobservable reasons (sector
effects or other) which lead to a selection bias between named and non-named
countries. We therefore also report results based on a Heckman two-step estimation




In tables 4a,b and c we show the regression results of estimating equation (1)
under the different specifications discussed above. The first column of table 4a shows
OLS results with heteroscedastic consistent standard errors, based on clusters of the
case numbers. The second column of table 4a shows the results of a robust regression
which controls for outliers. In column 1 we find no statistically significant effect of
antidumping actions on imports from the non-named countries. In contrast, imports
for the named countries are reduced with 67% in case a duty is imposed and 53% in
case a price undertaking is imposed. Since measures are imposed for a period of 5
years this is equivalent to an average annual reduction in imports from the named
countries of about 13% and 10% respectively. The magnitude of these effects come
across as rather high. Nevertheless, the negative sign of the duty and price
undertaking measures on named countries' import values is the expected one since
duties and price undertakings raise consumer prices on the European market which
reduces demand for imports from the named countries. Based on the estimates in
column (1) of table 4a we find that there is no statistically significant effect thatindicates a presence of import diversion from the named to the non-named countries.
However, as noted earlier, there are a considerable number of outliers in the data,
which might spuriously affect the results under OLS. It is therefore useful to compare
the results in column (1) with those in column (2), where we properly control for
outliers by using a robust regression technique.
Overall, the magnitude of the effects under robust regression are —as expected-
smaller. In particular, we find that import values from the non-named countries are
now increased by 13% when a duty is imposed, albeit at the 10% significance level.
The imports from the named countries are reduced by 31% (-0.44+0.13) when a duty
is imposed. This effect is almost half of the one found in column (1). In addition, a
price-undertaking has a negative effect on import values of the named countries of
38% without significantly affecting the imports of the non-named. In contrast to the
results in column (1), the coefficient on terminations for the named countries is —17%
and statistically significant at the 10% level. This negative effect on named countries'
imports, even when the demand for protection is rejected, could be an indication of
how much 'being under investigation' restricts imports of the named countries. While
Staiger and Wolak (1994) and Harrison (1991) for the US find that being named
disciplines imports as much as imposing a duty, the coefficient on terminations
suggests an investigation effect that is somewhat smaller than the effects of actual
protection. It is interesting to note that the effect of terminations becomes statistically
significant once we control for outliers. Since the outliers presumably capture new
aggressive entrants in the EU market, the robust regression could be interpreted more
as representative for the traditional importers. This suggests that if traditional
importers are under investigation, they will behave in a more careful way to avoidprotection. In contrast, new and aggressive importers are not affected by being under
investigation, perhaps because they anticipate protection in any case.
Based on the estimates of column (2) in table 4a we find that a duty increases
imports from the non-named countries compared to to on average per case with 8.7
Million ECU, while imports from the named ones decrease on average per case with
11.9 Million ECU. For price undertakings there is no statistically significant effect
for non-named countries, while for named countries the estimates suggest an average
decrease in imports of 14.6 Million ECU per case. Since 25% of all cases end in price
undertakings, we may conclude that, as already suggested by the results of column
(1), import diversion in the European Union is rather limited. This contrasts with the
findings of Prusa (1997) for the US where import diversion is substantial enough to
offset most of the negative effects on named countries.
In columns (1) and (2) of table 4b we report similar results, but for the split
samples of named versus non-named countries, again we report both OLS adjusted for
clusters and robust regression results. Irrespective of the estimation method we find
only statistically significant effects of the antidumping measures for the named
countries, while we find no statistically significant positive effect for the non-named
ones. The split regressions suggest that antidumping measures are effective and that
there is no import diversion taking place. The magnitude of the effects of antidumping
measures is smaller than the magnitudes in table 4a. In the split regressions we allow
all the variables in the regression to have different effects according to being named
or not. The qualitative results, however, that import diversion is lower than in the US,
persists.
In columns (1) and (2) of table 4c we test whether our results are subject to
selection bias. In particular, we test whether 'being named' in an AD-investigation israndom or not. If it is the case that certain characteristics of the group of named
countries trigger them into this category, the regression estimates will be biased. This
calls for the use of a two step Heckman procedure to correct for selection bias (see
also appendix). The key feature of this procedure is to use an observable variable
which is likely to affect selection into the group of named versus non-named, but
which is not included in explaining the regression of interest. For this purpose we
selected the variable 'import growth of named (non-named) countries prior to the year
of initiation', (import growth t01) as well as the 'log of import value two years prior to
the year of initiation' (ln(import) toz). These variables are chosen because at to the
average import value of named countries is smaller than for non-named countries and
by the fact that the outliers suggest that many of the named countries are new
importers in the EU who enter aggressively and hence would have a high import
growth rate prior to to.
In column (1) of table 4c we show the results for named countries, adjusted
for potential selection bias, while column (2) shows the results for non-named
countries. In the second part of the column (1) and (2) we also show the associated
probit equation of estimating the probability of being named (non-named). After
controlling for selection bias via the Heckman procedure in column (I), we find that
duties reduce the import values of the named countries by 37% or an annual average
reduction of 7%. The effect of price-undertakings is smaller, -23% or an annual
average reduction of 5%.Incolumn (2) we show the results for the non-named
countries, controlling for potential selection bias. We find that only price-
undertakings have a positive and statistically significant effect of 17% on the imports
of non-named countries over the period of protection or an annual average increase of
4%. The effects of duties are not statistically significant. Again the magnitude of thecoefficients and standard errors is different than in the other specifications, however,
our qualitative result of low import diversion still holds.
In the second part of columns (1) and (2) we report the results of the first step
of the Heckman procedure, a probit equation estimating the probability of named. It
can be noticed that import growth and the import value at to2 are both statistically
significant in explaining the probability of being named (non-named). In particular,
import growth has a positive and statistically significant effect for named countries,
but a negative effect for the group of non-named ones. Also import size has a negative
effect for named countries, but a positive one for non-named. This means that if the
growth rate of imports is high before a case is initiated there is a higher probability of
being named. Likewise, if the total import value of countries is high before a case is
initiated there is a lower probability of being named. For the non-named group we
find, as expected the opposite result: the higher the import growth before a case is
initiated, the lower the probability of being in the non-named group. Likewise, the
higher the total import value at to2, the more likely a country will belong to the non-
named group. These findings are consistent with the fact that new aggressive
importers, with relatively low initial levels of total imports are likely to end up in an
AD investigation.
The results based on the Heckman correction model confirm our earlier results
that import diversion in the European Union as a result of antidumping actions is
rather limited compared to the US. This also suggests that the potential selection bias
in the previous regressions is not very serious. Nevertheless, a test statistic is reported
at the bottom of table 4c, A,, which tests for the correlation between the selection
equation (step 1) and the actual equation of interest (step 2). This statistic, X, gives an
indication whether there is a statistical reason to believe selection bias is important(appendix). We find that ) is statistically significant, which suggests that selection
bias is present. However, whether we control for selection bias or not yields
qualitatively the same results, only the quantitative effects are slightly different.
Discussion of the results
One reason why import diversion in the EU is smaller than in the US could be
the lower duty levels imposed by the EU as a result of injury margin protection which
puts a limit on the potential benefits of antidumping protection for non-named
importers. Another reason for the lower amount of import diversion in the EU could
be the greater extent of uncertainty and information asymmetries surrounding the EU
decision making process. Comparative political economy studies in this area have
shown that antidumping decisions in the US are more of a 'technical nature' (Finger,
Hall and Nelson, 1982; Baldwin and Steagall, 1994) while those in the EU are subject
to greater political influence (Tharakan and Waelbroeck, 1994). The lower degree of
transparency and predictability in the EU could be one of the possible explanations
for the more prudent reaction of non-named importers in terms of increasing their
import values15.
A third reason could be related to the effects of AD-actions on decisions of
firms to engage in foreign direct investment. Belderbos (1997) using firm level data of
the Japanese electronics industry subject to European and American antidumping
investigations, finds that Japanese firms are more likely to switch to tariff jumping
15Forexample the retrospective system in the US gives importers, both named and non-named, an idea
of the magnitude of the duty that will have to be paid by the named countries in the case of an
affirmative finding. With the prospective system in the EU, the uncertainty regarding the duty lasts
longer in particular for the non-named countries. Moreover, when price-undertakings are imposed the
extent to which named countries have to pull up their prices is never revealed by the Commission in the
Official Journal reports.FDI in response to European AD-actions than compared to the US. In the case of
'antidumping jumping 'FDI in Europe, imports from named countries are replaced by
local production, which could explain the lower benefits to non-named countries
through import diversion in Europe compared to the US.
Another possible explanation may be provided by the nature of competition as
suggested by some theoretical models (Staiger and Wolak, 1992; Veugelers and
Vandenbussche, 1999, Vandenbussche and Wauthy, 1999). The effects of import
diversion in highly concentrated markets (or markets with imperfect competition) can
go in different directions. First, in highly concentrated sectors we might expect entry
barriers and oligopolistic reactions to be important. In this case, import diversion from
named to non-named countries might be expected. On the other hand, in highly
concentrated sectors we may also expect that import diversion is going to be less
important since the elasticity of product demand is likely going to be low. Hence a
price increase due to a duty or an undertaking will have small effects on the quantity
sold. In this case, we might expect less import diversion in highly concentrated
sectors and thus more in lowly concentrated ones. In addition, in lowly concentrated
sectors, where there exists a lot of competition, we may expect that entry is easy so
that non-named countries will find it easier to increase their imports in response to
antidumping measures imposed on named countries, unless it is the domestic sector
which fills the market niche. As an experiment we test whether market structure
matters at all in explaining import diversion. In table 5wereport the results of import
diversion in lowly versus highly concentrated industries. The split of highly versus
lowly concentrated industries is based on the average C5 production concentration
ratio for the EU, defined at the three digit NACE sector level (Davies and Lyons,
1996). Sectors with a concentration ratio higher than the average of 37% are classifiedas highly concentrated sectors. It turned out that almost 50% of our sample was
characterised by above average concentration and 50% below average. We also
experimented with other cut-off levels, but the main results persisted.
The results of the OLS clustered technique reported in column (1) of table 5
indicate very large negative effects on imports from the named countries. These
effects are somewhat reduced if we consider the robust regressions in column (2). In
particular, from column (2) we find that in highly concentrated sectors duties increase
imports from the non-named countries by 27% on average, while undertakings
increase imports from the non-named countries by 34% on average. Duties reduce
imports from named countries by 61% (-0.88+0.27), while undertakings reduce
imports by 18% (-0.52+0.34). This suggests that in highly concentrated sectors there
exists strong import diversion from named to non-named countries for both duties and
price-undertakings. The average import value at to in highly concentrated sectors for
named countries is 60.7 Million ECU and for non-named ones 88.9 Million ECU.
These figures and the estimated coefficients suggest that the effects of AD-actions on
named countries are substantially, but not entirely, offset by increased imports from
the non-named countries16.
The results for highly concentrated industries stand in sharp contrasts with the
results for the lowly concentrated sectors shown in column (3) and (4) of table 5. For
lowly concentrated sectors under robust regression analysis in column (4), we find
negative effects of antidumping protection in the named countries (-18% for duties
16Basedon the estimates of column (2) duties increase imports from the non-named countries by 24
Million ECU on average per case, while imports from the named countries are reduced by 37 Million
ECU on average per case. Undertakings increase imports from the non-named countries with 30.2
Million ECU on average per case and reduce imports from the named ones with 10.9 Million ECU on
average per case. In this latter case the increase in imports from the non-named countries more than
offsets the reduction in imports from the named ones, however, only 25% of the cases are affected by
price undertakings.and —23% for price-undertakings) but no significant increases in the import values of
the non-named, hence no trade diversion is occurring.
As suggested before, a priori many things can happen in case of imperfect
competition. The experiment that we reported in table 5suggeststhat concentration
might be an important factor in explaining import diversion. A possible explanation
for strong trade diversion in highly concentrated sectors is that the effects of
antidumping policy are offset by strategic rivalry, rendering antidumping policy
largely ineffective in industries where the players are large and their number is
limited. Tn particular, it has been shown by Sutton (1991), Lyons et al. (1999) among
others that highly concentrated sectors are often associated with vertically
differentiated products, i.e. products which are characterised by quality differences.
European antidumping cases can involve imports where the foreign product is of a
lower quality than the European 'like product' as was shown in a recent paper by
Vandenbussche and Wauthy (1999) 'Whenantidumping cases involve vertically
differentiated products and the Commission, through the imposition of a duty or a
price-undertaking, does not allow the foreign products of lower quality to be sold at a
lower price than the European price, it effectively denies foreign importers a positive
market share in the EU. Injury margin protection, which is specific to the EU context,
implies that the duty level or the price-undertaking imposed is aimed at forcing the
foreign importer to meet the price set by the European industry. Vandenbussche and
Wauthy (1999) argue that when the foreign importer is forced to sell its lower quality
product at the higher price of the European product, the demand for the low quality
foreign product will drop drastically. Hence, given that the equilibrium market
17
Examplesof Antidumping cases where vertically differentiated products are regarded as similar' by
the Commission are the Standardized Electric Motors case against Central European importers
(Official Journal L 83 p4, 27.3.1987), the Japanese dot matrix printers case (Official Journal L317 p33-structure of vertically differentiated industries is one where the number of firms is
limited (Sutton, 1991), we would expect antidumping protection in highly
concentrated industries to result in large reductions of named countries' imports to the
benefit of non-named countries.
The extent to which the larger amount of trade diversion for the US as
reported by Prusa (1997), can be explained through concentration ratios seems worth
investigating. In particular, as shown by Lyons et al. (1999), while the average C4
concentration level for Europe is estimated at 20%, the average for the US is 31%.
One reason for the lower concentration level in Europe could be related to the fact
that markets in Europe are more segmented than in the US, which leads to the
potential of some firms to have a dominant market position in some countries, but not
at the European level.
44, 24.11.1988) and the polyester yarn case from the US, Mexico, Taiwan and Korea (Official Journal
L348 p49-55, 17.13.1988)V. Conclusion
This paper studied how European antidumping policy affects import flows into
the EU at the 8-digit product level from countries that were under investigation and
either faced a duty, price-undertaking or a termination versus countries that were also
importing the same product but that were not under investigation. In contrast to
findings for the US, our results do not show strong import diversion effects suggesting
that antidumping policy is more effective in Europe. These results hold even after we
control for potential sample selection bias. Depending on the estimation method and
model that is used we estimate different magnitudes of the effects of antidumping
measures on import values of named and non-named countries. Some of these effects
come across as rather high, which might be due to a number of outliers. The key
message, however, that there is little or no trade diversion in the European Union
persists, irrespective of the estimation method that is used.
We also find European antidumping policy to be most effective in competitive
sectors, characterised by low concentration levels, while in highly concentrated
sectors we found that trade diversion is substantial and offsets the effects of
antidumping measures on named countries to the benefit of non-named ones.
Differences in concentration levels could be one explanation why trade diversion
appears to be stronger for the US than for Europe. However, this result needs further
investigation.
The lower amount of import diversion in Europe could also be due to the
lower duty levels as a result of injury margin protection, as opposed to dumping
margin protection for the US, which limits the benefits of protection for the non-
named countries. An additional reason could be the lack of transparency and thegreater extent of uncertainty regarding the actual levelsof protection in Europe in
comparison to the US which could explain the relatively small effect on non-named
countries' imports into the EU.Appendix:
The Heckman selection model assumes that a potential observation jisobserved if
zIY+U1j>0,
where uij has a standard normal distribution. Simultaneously, there is another
regression equation
=xiJ3+CU2j
where142]alsohas a standard normal distribution, but is potentially correlated with
the error term of the first equation, with correlation r. If this is the case, standard
regression techniques applied to the second equation (which in our caseis equation
(1)) yield biased results. Heckman (1976) proses a solution to estimatesuch a model
simultaneously with maximum likelihood (see Greene, 1993). One test statistic, which
is often reported is A. =ar. If2c is statistically different from zero, then selection bias
is important.References
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(1) Efta, Portugal, Spain, GDR, USA, Canada, Japan, Turkey, Austria, Finland, Russia, Sweden
(2) Hong-Kong, Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Singapore, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, OPEC, Egypt, India,
Macao, Malaysia, South Africa, Trinidad, Tobago, Israel
(3) Belarus, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Czech Republic, Former Jug. Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania,

















Manufacture of metal articles Instrument
engineering
Processing of rubber and plastics
Manufacture of paper and paper products
Footwear and clothing industry
Other manufacturing industries
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-0.02Table 4a: Effects of European AD-actions on imports
(1) OLS (2) Robust
Ln (import) to-I 0.75* (0.05) 0.85 (0.01)
Duty (D) 0.12 (0.10) 0.13** (0.07)
Undertaking (U) 0.17 (0.13) 0.10 (0.08)
Termination (T) 0.04 (0.14) -0.02 (0.07)
Duty x Named (DxN) 0.67* (0.15) 0.44* (0.09)
Undertaking x Named (UxN) 0.53* (0.14) 0.38* (0.10)
Termination x Named (TxN) -0.20 (0.16) 0.17** (0.09)
Number (Num) 0.10 (0.10) 8.02 (0.04)
Number x Named (NumxN) 0.25* (0.10) 0.19* (0.05)
Named (N) 0.32* (0.11) 0.29* (0.08)
Year dummies yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes
F 255.5 244.9
R2 0.72 -
Numberof observations 2997 2997
Note: In brackets are heteroskedastic consistent standard errors, *denotessignificant at
the 5% level, **atthe 10% level.Table 4b: Effects of European AD-actions on imports
(1) Named (2) Non-named
OLS Robust OLS Robust
Ln (import)oi 0.09* 0.8* 0.82* 0.92*
(0.08) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01)
Duty (D) 0.44* 0.19* 0.04 -0.01
(0.15) (0.1) (0.09) (0.06)
Undertaking (U) 0.36* 0.24* 0.15 0.01
(0.17) (0.1) (0.14) (0.06)
Termination (T) 0.33 -0.02 -0.09 -0.08
(0.19) (0.1) (0.13) (0.06)
Number (Num) 0.46* 0.30* 0.03 0.04
(0.17) (0.06) (0.10) (0.03)
Year dummies yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes
R2 0.67 - 0.78 -
F-test 4442 89.54 352 180.3
Number of observartions 1351 1351 1646 1646
Note: In brackets are heteroskedastic consistent standard errors, *denotessignificant at
the 5% level, **atthe 10% level.Table 4c: Effects of European AD-actions on imports
(1) Heckman (2) Heckman
Correction for namedCorrection for non-named
Ln (import)oi 0.06* (0.02) 0.74* (0.01)
Duty(D) O.37* (0.11) 0.07 (0.07)
Undertaking (U) 0.23* (0.11) 0.17* (0.07)
Termination (T) -0.13 (0.11) -0.03 (0.07)
Number (Num) 0.30* (0.07) 0.01 (0.04)
Year dummies yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes
Probit:
Import growth (t-1) 0.07* (0.03) 0.13* (0.03)
Ln(import)t-2 0.30* (0.01) 0.28* (0.01)
Year dummies yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes
1.04* (0.10) 0.91* (0.04)
number of observations 2997 2997
Note: In brackets are heteroskedastic consistent standard errors, *denotessignificant at
the 5% level, **atthe 10% level.Table 5: Effects in Highly Concentrated versus Lowly Concentrated Sectors
(1) High C5 (2) High C5 (3) Low CS (4) Low C5
OLS Robust OLS Robust
Ln (import)oi 0.68* 0.79* 0.81* 0.88*
(0.08) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01)
Duty(D) 0.14 0.27** 0.05 -0.01
(0.17) (0.15) (0.12) (0.07)
Undertaking (U) 0.33 0.34* -0.03 -0.09
(0.24) (0.15) (0.13) (0.08)
Termination (T) -0.13 -0.09 0.09 0.02
(0.19) (0.15) (0.16) (0.08)
Duty x Named (DxN) 0.87* 0.88* 0.56* 0.17*
(0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.09)
Undertaking x Named (UxN)0.68* 0.52* 0.30** 0.23*
(0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.10)
Termination x Named (TxN) -0.24 0.27* -0.27 -0.09
(0.21) (0.20) (0.23) (0.09)
Number (Num) 0.26 0.10 0.01 0.07
(0.20) (0.09) (0.13) (0.04)
Number x Named (NumxN) 0.54* 0.50* 0.09 0.04
(0.18) (0.13) (0.12) (0.04)
Named (N) 0.46* 0.43* -0.20 -0.20
(0.18) (0.16) (0.16) (0.07)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes
F 80.67 131.8 130.9 222.02
R2 0.69 - 0.76
Note: In brackets are heteroskedastic consistent standard errors, *denotessignificant at the 5% level,
**atthe 10% level.